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Abstract
While the role of discourse connectives has long been acknowledged in argumen-
tative frameworks, these approaches often take a coarse-grained approach to con-
nectives, treating them as a unified group having similar effects on argumentation. 
Based on an empirical study of the straw man fallacy, we argue that a more fine-
grained approach is needed to explain the role of each connective and illustrate their 
specificities. We first present an original corpus study detailing the main features 
of four causal connectives in French that speakers routinely use to attribute mean-
ing to another speaker (puisque, étant donné que, vu que and comme), which is a 
key element of straw man fallacies. We then assess the influence of each of these 
connectives in a series of controlled experiments. Our results indicate each connec-
tive has different effects for the persuasiveness of straw man fallacies, and that these 
effects can be explained by differences in their semantic profile, as evidenced in our 
corpus study. Taken together, our results demonstrate that connectives are important 
for argumentation but should be analyzed individually, and that the study of fallacies 
should include a fine-grained analysis of the linguistic elements typically used in 
their formulation.
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1 Introduction
The straw man fallacy is commonly defined as a refutational move which oper-
ates by misrepresenting the content put forward by the opponent in order to attack 
it more easily (see e.g. Aikin and Casey 2011, 2016; van Eemeren et  al. 2014; 
Oswald and Lewiński 2014). As such, it typically involves an unfaithful repre-
sentation of the content put forward by the interlocutor, meaning that there has to 
be a discrepancy between what has been said by the speaker and what has been 
reported by the person uttering a straw man. What makes the straw man a com-
plex fallacy to analyze is that the distortion oftentimes operates by hiding behind 
a resemblance, giving it the appearance of a legitimate representation. The mis-
representational aspect can be related to different elements of the content and 
take many different forms, as described by Aikin and Casey (2011, 2016).
However, the acceptability of an argument does not only depend on its content, 
but also on the linguistic elements and structures chosen to convey the informa-
tional content, as these formal cues have a bearing on the representation of the 
argument’s content. Linguistic elements like connectives, in particular, play an 
important role for the interpretation of discourse because they can encode pro-
cedural meaning which provides indications on the way the conceptual informa-
tion has to be processed (e.g. Blakemore 2002). By so doing, they influence the 
output representation, in other words whether an argument is interpreted as being 
acceptable or not (e.g. Kamalski et  al. 2008). Thus, connectives can be consid-
ered to be an important aspect in the study of argumentative discourse.
Causal connectives are particularly important for the interpretation of dis-
course because causal relations create a high degree of coherence (Sanders 2005). 
The impact of causal connectives on discourse processing and discourse compre-
hension has long been demonstrated in discourse processing studies (e.g. Mil-
lis et  al. 1995; Sanders et  al. 2007; Zufferey and Gygax 2016). Their role has 
also been studied to a certain extent in argumentation theory (e.g. Anscombre and 
Ducrot 1983; Ducrot et al. 1980; van Eemeren, Houtlosser and Snoek Henkemans 
2007a, b; Tseronis 2011). However, these studies often use a broad category that 
does not differentiate between elements such as discourse markers (well, actu-
ally) and connectives (because, if) that have been demonstrated in pragmatics and 
discourse studies to have only partially overlapping functions (e.g. Crible 2018). 
By contrast, many studies in the field of pragmatics have provided fine-grained 
analyses of connectives in corpus data (e.g. Degand 2004; Pit 2007; Zufferey 
2012) and many psycholinguistic studies have demonstrated the fundamental 
role that connectives play for discourse processing and comprehension (e.g. Mur-
ray 1997; Sanders and Noordman 2000; Traxler et al. 1997; Zufferey and Gygax 
2016). Yet, psycholinguistic studies have assessed the role of connectives in short 
expository texts and even in isolated sentences, but have not considered their use 
in argumentative contexts. This paper aims at applying the fine-grained method 
of pragmatics and psycholinguistics to analyze the role of causal connectives in 
argumentative contexts, more specifically in the case of the straw man fallacy. 
In so doing, it contributes to the development of a recent trend in argumentation 
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studies which tackles the relationships between argumentation and language (e.g. 
Herman et al. 2018; Hinton 2019; Oswald et al. 2018, 2020; Pollaroli et al. 2019).
This paper is structured as follows. Section  2 presents a state of the art start-
ing with previous research on the straw man fallacy and the role of connectives in 
argumentation. After an overview of theoretical research, we present experimental 
research on fallacies. These considerations will lead us to the question of connec-
tives and how they are described in argumentation. We then move on to completing 
the background on the function of connectives and present the findings from several 
pragmatic and psycholinguistic studies that have considered the role of connectives 
in discourse. In Sect. 3, we present an original corpus analysis of the four French 
causal connectives that convey attributed meaning and can therefore be used in the 
linguistic formulation of a straw man. This study leads us to define an empirically-
based semantic profile for each connective. In Sect.  4, we assess the role of each 
connective for the persuasiveness of straw man fallacies in a series of experiments. 
We discuss the results of these experiments in light of the semantic profile of each 
connective based on corpus data, and present further avenues of enquiry for the role 
of connectives in argumentation in Sect. 5.
2  State of the Art
2.1  The Straw Man Fallacy and Connectives in Argumentation
While research on fallacies is now established as a core research topic in argumen-
tation studies (Hamblin 1970; van Eemeren and Grootendorst 1992; Hansen and 
Pinto 1995; Walton 1995; Tindale 2007), the straw man fallacy itself has mostly 
been studied from one very specific perspective. Along with early pragma-dialec-
tical considerations on the straw man in the 1990s (van Eemeren and Grootendorst 
1992; van Eemeren and Houtlosser 1999), most theoretical approaches to this fal-
lacy have explored it from a normative and/or descriptive perspective (Aikin and 
Casey 2011, 2016; van Eemeren et  al. 2002, 2014; Lewiński 2011; and Lewiński 
and Oswald 2013; Oswald and Lewiński 2014 to a certain extent). Whilst these 
approaches diverge in their focus, they agree on the core features of the straw man 
and define it as a misrepresentation of an original position that seeks to weaken 
this position in order to make it more easily refutable (see e.g. Aikin and Casey 
2011, 2016; Lewiński 2011; Oswald and Lewiński 2014). These definitions of the 
straw man focus on two essential aspects of the fallacy: first, the straw man distorts 
the original point of view, and second, it does so with the aim of refuting it. The 
straw man therefore relies on the dichotomy between form, its distorting element, 
and function, the refutational aim (see Lewiński 2011). When misrepresenting the 
opponent’s position, the speaker of the straw man attributes the distorted version of 
the original position to the opponent. In doing so, arguers who perform a straw man 
distance themselves from a commitment to the misrepresenting version because they 
indirectly attribute commitment to the fallacious statement to their opponent. The 
straw man therefore not only qualifies as a misrepresentation of a position, but also 
as a misattribution of commitment regarding said position (see e.g. Müller 2020; de 
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Saussure and Oswald 2008; Walton 1996). Consequently, the position that is being 
refuted is a position that is distorted and falsely attributed to the opponent. Accord-
ing to Walton (1996), the dynamic of attributing a misrepresented version of a posi-
tion to the opponent and introducing its refutation as a rightful refutation of the orig-
inal position is an essential characteristic of the straw man’s treacherousness.
The misrepresentational element of the straw man rests on its linguistic features: 
when committing the fallacy, the interlocutor reformulates the original content in a 
distorted and often exaggerated way. The straw man aims at creating the impression 
that the distorted argument is closely related to the original standpoint, where in 
reality the fallacy uses a new, fictitious position, as a basis for its attack. This weak-
ens the original position and makes it easier to attack, which ultimately can lead to 
a reversal of the burden of proof (e.g. de Saussure 2018; Walton 1995; Walton et al. 
2013). When a straw man fallacy is performed, a quite particular argumentative 
move happens: the interlocutor uttering the straw man attacks the speaker by mis-
representing their point of view, and as a result, the speaker now finds themselves 
in a defensive position and has to show that the interlocutor has misreported their 
speech. This misrepresentation does not only entail an infraction of the burden of 
proof by shifting the attention to the original speaker (van Eemeren et al. 2002; Wal-
ton 1995; Walton et al. 2013), but is, following the pragma-dialectical framework, a 
violation of the third rule for critical discussion which states that one has to attack 
the standpoint that has actually been brought forward (e.g. van Eemeren et al. 2002). 
Any distortion, oversimplification, exaggeration or other type of inaccurate report-
ing of the original standpoint would therefore be considered to be a fallacious argu-
mentative move from a dialectical perspective. Yet, following de Saussure (2018), 
the straw man can remain a winning move from a rhetorical perspective because 
it shows the oratory skills of the individual producing the fallacy, even if it fails in 
persuading.
The above-mentioned selection of approaches has brought insights on a variety 
of observations regarding the straw man fallacy. These perspectives have not yet 
focused in depth on an empirical approach of the linguistic structure used to perform 
a straw man, which highlights that there is a need for complementary investigations 
with a more linguistic-oriented approach to this fallacy that take into consideration 
the structural elements that play a role for the communication of straw man fallacies. 
Such approaches provide a detailed understanding on how linguistic choices like the 
use of connectives, the locus of the misrepresentation, and many other factors, can 
alter the acceptability of fallacies like the straw man. In addition, such linguistic 
analysis should rest on empirical findings, as they can specifically target how differ-
ent linguistic formulations are processed by ordinary arguers. Such studies enable an 
account of the way subtle changes in the wording of a fallacious argument like the 
straw man can influence how it is perceived by the interlocutor.
Despite the important body of literature that has discussed the straw man fallacy 
from a theoretical perspective, experiments on the straw man are still very rare, even 
though empirical approaches to the study of fallacies in general have increased in 
recent years (e.g. van Eemeren et al. 2009, 2012; Hahn and Hornikx 2016; Harris 
et al. 2016; Lillo-Unglaube et al. 2014; Ozols et al. 2016). Among all these studies, 
only the one by Bizer et al. (2009) focused on the straw man. In their experiments 
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(Bizer et al. 2009), they assessed the elements that influence the persuasiveness of 
the straw man and tested whether personal relevance plays a role on the fallacy’s 
effectiveness. In a first experiment, they compared two political statements that 
were either placed in a high-relevance context (i.e. the content was important to the 
hearer) or a low-relevance context (i.e. the content was of no particular importance 
to the hearer). Their results showed that participants in the low-relevance condition 
were more likely to be persuaded by the straw man fallacy. In the second exper-
iment, Bizer et  al. (2009) assessed whether the effectiveness of a straw man was 
affected by individual differences in personality traits, like the need for cognitive 
closure, which is related to decisiveness and need for structure. Bizer et al. (2009) 
found that participants who had a low need for cognitive closure, in other words 
who were not in a hurry to get to a conclusion, were more influenced by straw man 
fallacies than participants with a high need for cognitive closure. These experiments 
have therefore demonstrated that there are indeed individual differences that influ-
ence the persuasiveness of straw man fallacies. This begged the question whether 
elements other than the cognitive features investigated by Bizer et al. (2009), espe-
cially linguistic elements pertaining to the formulation of the fallacy, can have an 
impact on its effectiveness as well.
In previous work (Schumann etal. 2019), we tackled this question and identified 
several linguistic factors that play a role on the acceptability of arguments containing 
a straw man fallacy in French. We defined the acceptability of the straw man based 
on the participants’ ability to detect the fallacy: the lower the acceptability for a fal-
lacious argument, the higher the likelihood that it was implicitly detected. In the first 
experiment, we investigated whether straw man fallacies were more acceptable (i.e., 
were more likely to remain undetected) when they targeted the opponent’s stand-
point or when they targeted the opponent’s argument. Our results clearly indicated 
that the straw man was better accepted when it targeted the argument rather than 
the standpoint. We concluded that the straw man was less visible when it targeted 
the argument because it involved a lower-level disagreement. Indeed, it is possible 
to disagree with one specific argument but still agree with the general standpoint. 
In contrast, disagreement with the standpoint itself involves a global disagreement 
between speakers. The second experiment assessed the difference between a mis-
represented content introduced explicitly by the French causal connective puisque 
(roughly equivalent to the English since) or implicitly, through the simple juxtapo-
sition of the two segments. In both cases, the formulation of the fallacious argu-
ment remained identical, the only element that changed was the presence or absence 
of puisque. Results showed that the straw man was better accepted when the fal-
lacious content was juxtaposed to the previous segment rather than introduced by 
the connective puisque. We concluded that because of its attributive meaning (i.e. 
the fact of presenting the content as attributed to the opponent), the connective 
puisque acted as a signpost alerting participants to the possible presence of misat-
tributed content. In the third experiment, we tested for the difference between mis-
representations that were based on an explicit reformulation of the original speaker’s 
argument and distortions that were grounded on an implicit reformulation. In the 
case of the explicit variant, the wording of the argument containing a straw man 
was kept as close as possible to the original, only exaggerating one noun phrase. 
 J. Schumann et al.
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For example, in the original argument it was stated that ‘having a child means a 
lot of financial charges’ and the distorted version stated that ‘having a child means 
financial ruin’. For the implicit reformulation, the wording was more radically dif-
ferent and the reformulation relied on an implicit conclusion that could be drawn 
from the speaker’s meaning—i.e. ‘having a child means a lot of financial charges’ 
resulting in ‘it only is about the money’. We found that the straw man fallacies were 
more likely to be accepted when the misrepresented content was reformulated in an 
explicit rather than implicit way. We concluded that explicit reformulations created 
a sense of familiarity leading to a shallower processing of linguistic content. Taken 
together, the effects that we found in these experiments confirmed that the accept-
ability of the straw man fallacy, measured by hearers’ propensity to find them to 
be proportionate and coherent responses and to agree with the speaker who uttered 
them, can be increased or decreased by tweaking different linguistic factors. More 
important for the argument of this paper: the results we obtained for the connective 
puisque begged the question of whether other causal connectives could also influ-
ence the acceptability of straw man fallacies and if the effects we found for puisque 
are related specifically to this causal connective, or if other causal connectives that 
convey attributive meaning as well lead to similar effects.
The role of discourse markers, a notion including—but not limited to—discourse 
connectives, has long been acknowledged and discussed in several argumentative 
frameworks. Connectives like the French mais (closest to but in English), have been 
studied from a very early stage by Anscombre and Ducrot (1977), and they are still 
an object of inquiry today as Uzelgun et al. (2015) illustrate in their corpus analysis 
of "yes,but..." constructions in climate change debates and Rocci et al. (2020) dem-
onstrate in their recent cross-linguistic investigation on the use of adversative con-
nectives like mais in young children’s argumentation, showing that even the young-
est amongst arguers resort to linguistic resources like argumentative indicators to 
structure discourse. Various collaborations in the field of argumentation and lan-
guage (e.g. Herman, Jacquin and Oswald 2018; Oswald et  al. 2018) highlight that 
research on linguistic markers in argumentation has mostly been analyzed from two 
perspectives. The first approach follows the French tradition (e.g. Anscombre and 
Ducrot 1983; Ducrot et al. 1980) which theorizes that discourse markers or, following 
their terminology, words of discourse (les mots du discours, see Ducrot et al. 1980) 
have distinct functions in argumentative contexts: they indicate discursive relations 
between the segments of the utterance they link together, and shape the way the utter-
ance is oriented or interpreted (Anscombre and Ducrot 1983). They therefore opt for 
a more language-oriented approach—an argumentation-within-language perspective 
(l’argumentation dans la langue)—because argumentation simply cannot be isolated 
from its discursive intentions and argumentative orientations. This approach has been 
discussed and developed further by Anscombre and Ducrot themselves (e.g. Anscom-
bre 2001; Anscombre et al. 2013; Ducrot 1993) and many other researchers in similar 
fields of investigation (Carel 1999; Moeschler 1989; Roulet 1984).
The second approach, put forward by pragma-dialecticians (e.g. van Eemeren et al. 
2007a, b), focuses on argumentative indicators in a broader sense, including any form 
of linguistic marker that serves as an indicator of the argumentative move that has 
been made within the four stages of a critical discussion. When resolving a difference 
1 3
The Linguistic Formulation of Fallacies Matters: The Case…
of opinion, the ideal model postulates four stages that the arguers are going through: 
the confrontation stage during which the interlocutors acknowledge that there is a 
difference of opinion, the opening stage during which the interlocutors set up the 
rules for resolving the difference of opinion, the argumentation stage during which 
the interlocutors defend their respective standpoints, and the concluding stage during 
which the interlocutors evaluate if their difference of opinion has been solved or not 
(van Eemeren and Grootendorst 1992). Pragma-dialecticians argue that the role of 
argumentative indicators is related to the type of argumentative move which is being 
carried out, meaning that not every expression, or marker, or connective, or other 
type of indicator is used at the same stage when resolving a difference of opinion. If 
we look at the connective since for example, the pragma-dialectical framework (van 
Eemeren et al. 2007b, p.119) describes it as an indicator of a starting point of a dis-
cussion, because it implicitly conveys the meaning that all the parties involved in the 
discussion have agreed on the content of the segment following the connective.
Even if the argumentation-within-language approach and the pragma-dialectical 
approach differ in the way they tackle the subject, they both agree on the impor-
tance of linguistic markers, such as connectives, for argumentation. Nevertheless, 
the first approach is not sufficiently detailed in describing the distinct roles of the 
different words of discourse and pragma-dialecticians are more focused on a top-
down process, first identifying the argumentative move within a discussion and only 
then shifting the attention towards the indicators used to carry out the argumenta-
tive move. In order to get a more fine-grained understanding on how these markers 
work in specific argumentative situations, empirical research in the form of corpus 
studies (see e.g. Uzelgun et al. 2015) and experimental studies (see e.g. Schumann 
et al. 2019) have to be conducted to investigate the role of connectives within argu-
mentation. In this paper, we take a bottom-up perspective, and first perform a corpus 
study in order to define the core characteristics of each causal connective that can 
typically be used to introduce a straw man in the discourse segment following the 
connective. In turn, this empirically grounded description of the semantic profile 
of each connective will enable us to assess their role in experiments focusing on a 
specific argumentative situation. Taken together, these studies will both deepen our 
understanding of the functions of these connectives and show a link between their 
uses in corpus data and their role in an argumentative context. Before turning to our 
corpus study in Sect. 3, we present studies that have assessed the roles of connec-
tives for discourse processing and comprehension in the next section.
2.2  The Function of Connectives from a (psycho‑) Linguistic Perspective
Discourse connectives are linguistic elements used to structure discourse and 
increase textual coherence by establishing coherence relations between discourse 
segments (Halliday and Hasan 1976; Knott and Dale 1994; Mann and Thompson 
1988). Applied to an argumentative context, this means that connectives are used 
to indicate relations between standpoints and arguments, and the different positions 
held by the interlocutors. In addition, connectives are non-truth-conditional, more 
precisely, the semantic meaning of a proposition is not influenced by their presence. 
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Sentences (1) and (2) below express the same informational content, which illus-
trates the fact that the meaning in (2) is not affected by the absence of the causal 
connective as:
(1) The Earth is round, as it has been proven by empirical data.
(2) The Earth is round. It has been proven by empirical data.
When they are used however, connectives facilitate the processing and compre-
hension of discourse (Caron et al. 1988; Cozijn et al. 2011; Sanders and Noordman 
2000; Sanders et al. 2007; Zufferey and Gygax 2016). In example (1), the connective 
as instructs the reader to process the content following the causal connective as an 
argument in support of the preceding statement. Causal connectives, as referred to in 
this paper, are to be understood as a subcategory of connectives that encode coher-
ence relations based on a cause, an argument or a reason (see e.g. Pit 2003; Stukker 
and Sanders 2012). The causality has therefore more of a semantic and less of a 
material or physical orientation.
Another specificity of connectives is that they are polyfunctional, in other words 
they are used to express different relations depending on the context. The connective 
as, for example, can introduce a cause or a reason like in (1), but it can also be used 
to express a relation of temporal simultaneity as in (3):
(3) The rest of the group arrived as we were leaving.
The absence of a biunivocal relation between connectives and discourse relations 
can also be approached from the other side: in the majority of the cases, the same 
discourse relation can be expressed by different connectives. For example, a cause or 
a reason can be conveyed by several connectives like because, since, as, given that, 
etc. Yet, corpus studies have shown that these connectives are not interchangeable, 
as each of them has specific nuances of meanings (e.g. Pit 2007; Zufferey and Car-
toni 2012). In this paper, we compare the role of four French causal connectives that 
convey attributive meaning, in other words that can be used to introduce an argu-
ment implicitly attributed by the speaker to an external source, as these connectives 
can be used to introduce straw man fallacies.
So far, most studies that have assessed the roles of connectives empirically in 
pragmatics and psycholinguistics have made use of very short expository texts, 
or even no text at all but only sentences presented in isolation. To the best of our 
knowledge, only one empirical study has conclusively demonstrated that connec-
tives play a specific role in persuasive texts. Kamalski et  al. (2008) uncovered an 
important difference in the role played by objective causal connectives, namely con-
nectives used to link facts and events in the world (4), and subjective connectives, 
namely connectives that are used to link claims or arguments and conclusions drawn 
in the mind of the speaker (5).
(4) Henry was late for work because he missed his train.
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(5) Henry must have missed his train, since he still hasn’t arrived.1
They found that in persuasive texts, the presence of subjective causal connec-
tives created a forewarning effect, alerting readers to the persuasive intention of the 
writer and decreasing their willingness to accept its content. In a first experiment, 
Kamalski et al. (2008) included offline measures of persuasion targeting the readers’ 
beliefs, attitudes and intentions following reading. They found that texts contain-
ing subjective connectives were less persuasive compared to texts containing objec-
tive connectives. This effect was in addition related to participants’ perception of the 
writer’s intention. With subjective connectives, the intention of the writer was per-
ceived to be more strongly persuasive compared to the version containing objective 
connectives. It seems, therefore, that when participants encounter subjective connec-
tives, it forewarns them to the persuasive intention of the writer and this may cre-
ate resistance and lower acceptance of textual content. In this experiment, Kamalski 
et al. (2008) did not find a difference between texts containing almost no connec-
tives and texts containing subjective connectives. It seems therefore that the most 
persuasive version of a text is one that specifically contains objective connectives. In 
a second experiment, Kamalski et al. (2008) investigated the role of the forewarning 
effect even further. In an online reading task, they tested the processing of short texts 
containing an explicit formulation of the causal connection with either subjective 
connective or no connective and another version with either an objective connective 
or no connective. In this second experiment, they found that the short texts contain-
ing subjective connectives were less convincing compared to the implicit version, 
thus providing further evidence for the existence of a forewarning effect linked to 
the use of subjective connectives.
In sum, Kamalski et al.’s was the first study to uncover a forewarning effect linked 
to the use of subjective connectives. In our paper, we pursue this line of investi-
gation further by assessing the role of subjective connectives in a specific type of 
argumentative context, namely the acceptability of fallacious arguments. In addition, 
Kamalski et al. considered subjective connectives only as a global category in which 
many different connectives are included. Yet, subjectivity is a scalar notion (Degand 
and Pander Maat 2003) and some connectives are more strongly subjective than oth-
ers (Pit 2007; Zufferey and Cartoni 2012). In this paper, we will assess the way spe-
cific connectives differing in their degree of subjectivity create a forewarning effect 
in argumentative contexts. We will also show that subjectivity is not the only rele-
vant criterion that separates causal connectives, and that other semantic factors such 
1 An anonymous reviewer highlights that the difference between both examples can also be looked at 
in terms of a difference in the argumentation schemes they instantiate. Following the pragma-dialectical 
framework (e.g. Eemeren et al. 2002; Eemeren et al. 2014), (4) could indeed be described as instantiat-
ing a causal argumentation scheme, while (5) would be a case of symptomatic argumentation. However, 
although it would be tempting to investigate whether a difference of persuasiveness between both types 
of connectives translates into a difference of persuasiveness between types of argument schemes, our 
data does not allow us to answer this particular question. An experimental study in this direction should 
moreover establish beforehand whether there is a univocal correspondence between the use of a particu-
lar connective and one argumentation scheme – which is still, at this point, an open question.
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as the speaker’s attitude towards the attributed meaning and the type of information 
that is introduced—given or new—also play a role in argumentative contexts.
3  French Causal Connectives with an Attributive Meaning
Previous experimental research on French causal connectives has demonstrated 
that frequently used connectives like parce que, car, and puisque cannot be used 
interchangeably (Zufferey 2012). Using corpus data, other research has shown that 
a crucial difference between parce que on the one hand and car and puisque on the 
other lies on the degree of subjectivity of the relations that they typically convey (Pit 
2007; Simon and Degand 2007), as the connective car, and to an even greater extent 
puisque, are typically used more often to convey subjective causal relations such as 
claims and conclusions, while parce que is mostly used to convey objective rela-
tions between facts and events occurring in the world. Other studies focusing spe-
cifically on puisque have underlined that this connective is typically used to convey 
information that is already known to the addressee or at least that the speaker puts 
forward as being easily retrievable in the hearer’s cognitive environment. In other 
cases, the information presented by puisque is new for the hearer, but what is put 
forward as being known or indisputable is the causal link between the two segments 
(Franken 1996; Zufferey 2014). In a contrastive corpus study between French and 
English causal connectives, Zufferey and Cartoni (2012) have found that puisque 
does indeed convey a majority of given information.
In this paper, we focus more specifically on a partially different subgroup of con-
nectives, which can be used to convey a meaning the speaker attributes to someone 
else. Accordingly, because these are attributive connectives, we consider that they 
are linguistic expressions that are typically eligible to partake in the formulation 
of straw man fallacies, which function as misattributions. These connectives are in 
French: puisque, étant donné que, vu que and comme, and can roughly be translated 
with since, given that, seeing that, and as in English. We investigated three poten-
tially relevant features that may differentiate these connectives in language use: their 
degree of subjectivity, their propensity to convey given information; the speaker’s 
attitude towards the attributed content. The first two features were defined using 
similar criteria as those from earlier corpus studies on causal connectives (see espe-
cially Zufferey and Cartoni 2012 for an operationalized definition of subjectivity 
and givenness). The last feature was not used in previous work. However, we deem 
it to be particularly relevant to assess connectives that convey attributive meaning 
because the attitude a speaker holds toward the expressed content can serve as an 
indicator for disagreement. According to Sperber and Wilson (1986), interpretive 
uses of language can convey either an endorsing, a neutral or a dissociative attitude. 
We therefore use these three categories in our corpus study. Subjectivity, givenness 
and speaker attitude can all be related to the straw man fallacy. First, the straw man 
is mostly construed around claims that are distorted, rather than facts that are refor-
mulated in a sound way. As we have seen with Kamalski et al. (2008) in the previ-
ous section, using subjective connectives to introduce arguments can diminish their 
persuasiveness compared to objective connectives. This may therefore also apply to 
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fallacious arguments like the straw man. Second, connectives shape readers’ expec-
tations about the informational status of the segment following them, in other words 
whether it is given (i.e. already known or easily accessible) or new. The straw man 
creates the illusion that the distorted argument is given, as it is part of the common 
ground, whereas it is in fact a misrepresentation, as it contains new elements added 
by the speaker uttering the straw man rather than given information. Third, the atti-
tude of the speaker performing the straw man towards the expressed content may 
also influence how it is accepted. Using a connective with a dissociative meaning 
such as puisque to introduce an argument suggests that the speakers are distancing 
themselves from the content they are expressing, attributing it to the opponent or 
even a third party involved in the argument. In case of a straw man, this could fur-
ther highlight the difference of opinion between the interlocutors. The disagreement 
may be less evident if the fallacious arguments is preceded by a neutral connective 
or a connective used to convey an attitude of implicit endorsement.
In order to gather empirical data enabling us to compare the profile of these four 
connectives, we performed a corpus annotation of a randomly selected sample of 
200 occurrences of each connective from the French Web 2017 corpus (available 
through the Sketch Engine platform, Kilgarriff et  al. 2014). This corpus was cho-
sen because its size (over 6 billion words) and content (texts collected through web 
crawling) makes it possible to gather a highly varied sample in terms of speaker 
type, genre, etc. For the connectives puisque and étant donné que, all occurrences 
sampled from the corpus could be included in the analysis, as these connectives do 
not have alternative non-causal meanings. By contrast, the connective vu que is also 
found in non-connective uses (e.g. Nous avons vu que ce c’était possible). These 
non-connective uses represent about 18% of the data and were manually excluded. 
Additional occurrences were selected in order to reach a sample of 200 occurrences 
with a causal meaning. The connective comme is more problematic to analyze, 
because it is highly polyfunctional and has several other functions (temporal, com-
parative) as well as non-connective uses. As causal uses of this connective are said 
to be preferentially found in sentence-initial position in the LEXCONN database of 
French connectives (Roze et al. 2012) the corpus search was limited to sentence ini-
tial uses. Even so, comme was found to convey a causal meaning in only about 16% 
of the occurrences. As a result, about 1200 occurrences had to be examined in order 
to reach the number of 200 occurrences for the analysis.
In order to ensure the reliability of the data annotation, 10% of the occurrences 
were double coded by the first and the second author. As agreement was high 
between them on all three features (between 80 and 95% of agreement for all con-
nectives on the three features), the rest of the occurrences was coded only by the 
second author, who has extensive experience with the annotation of these features in 
corpus data.
Table 1 reports the number of subjective and objective relations conveyed by each 
connective in the corpus. A chi-square test of independence indicates that the dis-
tribution between objective and subjective relations is significantly different across 
connectives (χ2 = 105.41, df(3), p < 0.001). An inspection of standardized residuals 
indicates that this difference is due to an overuse of puisque (+ 2.41) and vu que 
(+ 2.5) to convey subjective relations as well as an underuse of comme (− 3.86), 
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whereas étant donné que does not significantly differ from the others (− 1.05). The 
difference is also due to an overuse of comme to convey objective relations (+ 6.41) 
as well as an underuse of puisque (− 4.01) and vu que (− 4.15), whereas étant donné 
que does not significantly differ (+ 1.75). In other words, puisque and vu que are the 
two most subjective connectives, not differing from each other, while étant donné 
que is less subjective and comme is the most objective of all four connectives.
Table 2 reports the number of segments containing new and given information 
in the segment following the four connectives. A chi-square test of independence 
indicates that the distribution between given and new information is significantly 
different between connectives (χ2 = 66.94, df(3), p < 0.001). An inspection of stand-
ardized residuals indicates that the difference is due to an overuse of puisque to con-
vey given information (+ 5.47) and an underuse of comme (− 3.98). The other two 
connectives do not differ (− 0.49 for étant donné que and − 1 for vu que). The differ-
ence is also due to an overuse of comme to convey new information (+ 2.6) and an 
underuse of puisque (− 3.57). Again, the other two connectives do not differ (+ 0.32 
for étant donné que and + 0.65 for vu que). This means that puisque is the connective 
of choice to convey given information, followed by étant donné que and vu que, and 
lastly comme, a connective that is only marginally used with this function.
Table 3 reports the number of occurrences in which the speaker expresses a neu-
tral, endorsing or dissociative attitude towards the causes it introduces. A chi-square 
test of independence indicates that the repartition between the three types of atti-
tudes is significantly different between connectives (χ2 =  58.18, df(6), p < 0.001). 
An inspection of standardized residuals indicates that the difference is due to an 
Table 1  Subjective and 
objective relations conveyed by 
each connective
puisque étant donné que vu que comme
Subjective relation 176 134 177 100
Objective relation 24 66 23 100
Total 200 200 200 200
Table 2  Given and new 
information conveyed in the 
cause segment following each 
connective
puisque étant donné que vu que comme
Given information 102 56 52 29
New information 98 144 148 171
Total 200 200 200 200
Table 3  Speaker attitude 
towards the content of the cause 
following the connective
puisque étant donné que vu que comme
Neutral attitude 137 102 95 135
Endorsing attitude 49 88 99 65
Dissociative attitude 14 0 6 0
Total 200 200 200 200
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underuse of vu que to convey a neutral attitude (− 2.18) whereas the other connec-
tives do not differ (+ 1.68 for puisque, − 1.02 for étant donné que, and + 1.49 for 
comme). In addition, there is a significant difference in speaker’s endorsing attitude, 
that is significantly linked to the use of vu que (+ 2.61) and avoidance of puisque 
(− 3.12), whereas the other two connectives do not differ (+ 1.87 for étant donné 
que and − 1.37 for comme). Finally, there is also a significant difference for the com-
munication of a dissociative attitude, a function that is specifically linked to the use 
of puisque (+ 3.97) and the avoidance of vu que (− 2.19) and comme (− 2.25). By 
contrast, étant donné que does not significantly differ from the others (+ 0.49).
Based on these corpus results, we summarize the semantic profile of each con-
nective in Table 4.
Based on these profiles, we can make the following hypotheses regarding the 
role of each connective for the acceptability of straw man fallacies. If subjectivity 
is indeed the only factor influencing the role of discourse connectives, as identi-
fied in the forewarning effect put forward by Kamalski et al. (2008), we expect that 
puisque and vu que will lead to lower acceptability scores, and consequently facili-
tate the detection of a straw man, because they will act as forewarners, whereas 
étant donné que and comme will not lessen the acceptability in a similar manner 
due to their lower degree of subjectivity. But if we are right to assume that the 
other two factors that we have identified also play a role in determining whether a 
specific connective acts as a forewarner or not, then we can expect different effects 
for each connective, as they all have a different profile based on these three fac-
tors. More specifically, we expect that puisque will play a stronger role, increasing 
the detectability of the straw man and decreasing its acceptability, compared to the 
other three connectives, because in addition to being highly subjective, it is most 
frequently used to convey given information and with an openly negative attitude. 
This would make it, next to the other three, the most suitable connective to express 
disagreement, i.e., a prominent linguistic resource for refutation. While the connec-
tive vu que is also highly subjective, it is not so strongly associated with the com-
munication of given information and the speaker attitude is one of endorsement. 
Both factors should contribute to lowering its effect as a forewarner, and thus to 
increasing the acceptability of arguments. The connective étant donné que is more 
moderately subjective than vu que and puisque, but contrary to vu que, the speaker 
does not explicitly endorse the content of the cause as often. As a result, both con-
nectives give more mixed signals than puisque and should therefore not lower 
acceptability scores. Finally, comme should not act as a forewarner at all, as it is 
Table 4  Profile of each 
connective based on the three 
relevant features: subjectivity, 
givenness and polarity of 
attitude
Degree of 
subjectivity
Degree of 
givenness
Polarity of attitude
puisque High High More dissociative
étant donné que Middle Middle Neutral
vu que High Middle More endorsing
comme Low Low Neutral
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more objective and used mostly to convey new information with a neutral attitude. 
As a consequence, we expect comme to be the connective that yields high accept-
ability rates which increases the probability for the fallacy to remain undetected. 
We assess these hypotheses by designing an experimental study that was performed 
separately for each connective, as we now outline.
4  Testing the Role of Causal Connectives for the Acceptability 
of Straw Man Fallacies
In four similar experiments, we investigated the role of four causal connectives in 
French that encode attributive meaning, using the same experimental framework 
as in (Schumann et  al.  2019). The first connective we tested was puisque, which 
can roughly be translated by the English since, even though these connectives are 
not fully equivalent (Zufferey and Cartoni 2012). As puisque was already tested in 
experiment 2 from (Schumann et al.  2019), we simply replicated this experiment for 
the current paper with new participants in order to further assess the existence of the 
reported effect. The experiments on the other connectives, namely étant donné que 
(closest to English given that), vu que (closest to English seeing that) and comme 
(closest to English as), are based on the same experimental design. All four experi-
ments were conducted separately. The overall aim was twofold: determine whether 
there is a difference on the acceptability of straw man fallacies when the fallacious 
segment is introduced explicitly by using a causal connective with attributive func-
tion, and when the fallacious argument is simply juxtaposed to the previous segment 
without the use of a connective, and to compare the role of each causal connective 
with one another in order to assess the roles of the features identified in Sect. 3.
4.1  Participants
We recruited 162 French-speaking participants (64 women, mean age: 25, age range: 
18–70) via the University of Fribourg and the crowdsourcing Platform Prolific© 
(Prolific, Oxford, UK). Participants recruited via the University of Fribourg were all 
first-year psychology students and received 30 min in experimental points for their 
participation. The participants recruited via Prolific were rewarded 2.70£ for their 
participation. All participants had to give their informed consent before taking part 
in the experiment. On average the participants needed 25 min to complete the study.
4.2  Materials
The participants were presented with 40 short dialogues about various topics 
between two persons, Barbara and Alexandre. All the items followed the same 
structure. The first part of the dialogue was always expressed by Barbara. As 
illustrated in (6), the first segment “It is crucial to better support young parents”, 
contained a standpoint which was then followed by an argument in support of the 
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standpoint “having a child means a lot of financial charges”. The two segments 
were linked with the causal connective parce que (which can roughly be trans-
lated with because).
(6) Barbara : Il est crucial de mieux soutenir les jeunes parents parce qu’avoir un 
enfant signifie beaucoup de charges financières.
 Barbara: It is crucial to better support young parents because having a child 
means having a lot of financial responsibility.
The first part of the dialogue remained the same in all four conditions. The 
critical statement was always expressed by Alexandre in the second part of the 
dialogue and sometimes contained a straw man and sometimes a legitimate argu-
ment. The first condition, illustrated in (7), represents a case of straw man where 
the fallacious argument is introduced with a connective. The first segment (S1) 
“Let’s raise the family allowance” constitutes a possible consequence drawn 
from the argument given by Barbara. As illustrated in examples (7) to (10), this 
initial part of Alexandre’s statement did not change across conditions. The first 
segment of Alexandre’s statement was then followed by the connective puisque, 
comme, étant donné que, or vu que (roughly equivalent respectively to: since, as, 
given that, seeing that) which signaled that the second segment (S2) containing 
an exaggerated version of Barbara’s argument resulting in “it only is about the 
money”, was a content that Alexandre attributed to Barbara. The structure of the 
statements remained the same (‘S1 connective S2’) throughout the conditions.
(7) Alexandre : Augmentons les allocations familiales CONNECTEUR on ne pense 
qu’à l’argent.
 Alexander: Let’s raise the family allowance CONNECTIVE it is only about the money.
In (8), the second condition reproduces the same statement but this time, the 
fallacious argument is juxtaposed to the previous segment (through a removal of 
the connective) and the causal relation is left implicit.
(8) Alexandre : Augmentons les allocations familiales. On ne pense qu’à l’argent.
 Alexander: Let’s raise the family allowance. It is only about the money.
The third experimental condition in (9) illustrates a non-fallacious reformula-
tion of the argument given by Barbara. Again, we find the same first segment 
than in the previous conditions. The reformulated but non-fallacious argument 
“parents are under economic pressure” is introduced with the connective in the 
second segment.
(9) Alexandre : Augmentons les allocations familiales CONNECTEUR les parents 
sont sous pression économique.
 Alexander: Let’s raise the family allowance CONNECTIVE the parents are under 
economic pressure.
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The fourth and last condition is shown in (10). It is the exact same sentence as in 
(9) but without any connective linking both segments.
 (10) Alexandre : Augmentons les allocations familiales. Les parents sont sous pres-
sion économique.
  Alexander: Let’s raise the family allowance. The parents are under economic 
pressure.
The four experimental conditions were attributed to four lists using a Latin square 
design, to ensure that all the participants only saw one out of the four possible con-
ditions per item. Every participant read and evaluated ten items per condition, mean-
ing that they saw forty dialogues in total. Since we tested four different connectives, 
there were four versions of the experiment run with a between-subject design to 
ensure that every participant saw the experimental conditions with only one of the 
connectives.
4.3  Procedure
The experiment was set up on Qualtrics© (Qualtrics LLC, Provo: Utah, USA) and 
sent to the participants via a weblink. The participants received short preliminary 
instructions before starting the experiment. They were informed that they were 
about to read forty dialogues taking place between two persons named Barbara and 
Alexandre on various societal topics. They were asked to take their time reading 
the dialogues and to respond intuitively to the four questions that would appear for 
every item. The participants were also asked to respond to socio-demographic ques-
tions about gender, age, native language, and place of residence. After completing 
this first phase, participants were given two trial dialogues to get them familiarized 
with the task. The experimental part followed this brief introduction. During the 
experimental phase, participants read the forty dialogues in a randomized order. For 
each dialogue, they had to respond to four questions on a 6-point Likert scale rang-
ing from ‘no, absolutely not’ to ‘yes, absolutely’ with an additional option (‘I don’t 
know’) they could select when they weren’t able or did not want to give an answer. 
The first two questions, illustrated in (11) and (12) aimed to assess their evaluation 
of two core features of the straw man fallacy.
 (11) Est-ce que la conclusion d’Alexandre est proportionnée par rapport à ce qu’a 
affirmé Barbara ?
Is the conclusion reached by Alexander proportionate to what Barbara has said?
 (12) Est-ce que la conclusion d’Alexandre découle de ce qu’a affirmé Barbara ?
Does the conclusion reached by Alexander follow from what Barbara has said?
The first question in (11) targeted the exaggerative nature of the straw man. This 
question aimed to assess whether participants were able to spot the more extreme 
positions in Alexandre’s reply compared to Barbara’s statement. The second ques-
tion in (12) aimed to assess whether participants noticed that the misrepresentation 
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disrupted the coherence relation between the two statements, as the segment follow-
ing the connective did not contain the cause initially presented by the speaker but 
a distorted version of it, while the connective used indicated that this cause should 
contain attributed content.
Questions 3 and 4 aimed to assess participants’ level of agreement with both 
Alexandre (13) and Barbara (14).
 (13) Êtes-vous d’accord avec Alexandre ?
Do you agree with Alexander?
 (14) Êtes-vous d’accord avec Barbara ?
Do you agree with Barbara?
We expected different patterns of responses for the two questions. On the one 
hand, we expected the responses concerning participants’ agreement with Alexandre 
to be influenced by the type of argument he presented (viz. fallacious or non-falla-
cious). If participants do detect fallacies, their agreement should be lower in these 
cases. On the other hand, the agreement with Barbara was designed as a control 
question. The responses to this question were expected to be based on the partici-
pants’ own opinions and world views since Barbara uttered her own opinion and did 
not react to someone else’s statement. The idea was that in answering (14), partici-
pants would only agree or disagree with Barbara’s views directly, without reacting to 
Alexandre’s discursive move, which came after Barbara voiced her opinion.
4.4  Analysis
The analysis was performed with a 2 × 2 repeated measure ANOVA with two within-
subject factors: the type of argument (fallacious or non-fallacious) and the connec-
tive (present or absent). A separate analysis was run with all four connectives. For 
the data analysis we only included responses given on a scale from 1 to 6; results 
given on the additional option ‘I don’t know’ were treated as missing data.
4.5  Results for the Connective puisque
The means for the acceptability of each condition and the standard deviation are 
reported in Table 5.
For the first question, there was a significant effect for the nature of the argu-
ment. Fallacious responses were less accepted (M = 3.221) than non-fallacious ones 
(M = 4.07) [F1 (1, 40) = 122.52, p < 0.001; F2 (1, 39) = 72,43, p < 0.001]. The results 
returned a significant effect for the presence or absence of puisque in the participant 
analysis (F1), but only approaching significance in the item analysis (F2) [F1 (1, 
40) = 4.30, p = 0.04; F2 (1, 39) = 3.10, p = 0.08].
For the question targeting the logical link between statements, results indicated 
two main effects: non-fallacious arguments were more accepted (M = 4.22) than fal-
lacious ones (M = 3.68) [F1 (1, 40) = 47.90, p < 0.001; F2 (1, 39) = 39.71, p < 0.001]. 
An argument introduced by puisque was less accepted (M = 3.86) compared to 
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the implicit version (M = 4.05) [F1 (1, 40) = 10.09, p = 0.003; F2 (1, 39) = 7.97, 
p = 0.007].
The third question, targeting the agreement with Alexander, returned the same 
pattern. A significant effect was found for the type of argument, with non-fallacious 
arguments yielding a higher acceptability score (M = 4.30) compared to fallacious 
ones (M = 3.30) [F1 (1, 40) = 95.82, p < 0.0001; F2 (1,39) = 85.77, p < 0.001]. Argu-
ments introduced by puisque were less accepted (M = 3.68) compared to implicit 
ones (M = 3.92) [F1 (1, 40) = 8.08, p = 0.007; F2 (1, 39) = 13.01, p = 0.001].
The question targeting the agreement with Barbara did return an effect of the type 
of argument. Non-fallacious arguments were better accepted (M = 4.62) than falla-
cious ones (M = 4.40) [F1 (1, 40) = 12.50, p = 0.001; F2 (1, 39) = 13.02, p = 0.001]. 
As expected, no effects were found for the use of the connective [F1 (1, 40) = 1.77, 
p = 0.19; F2 (1, 39) = 1.11, p = 0.30].
4.6  Results for the Connective étant donné que
In Table 6, we report the means and standard deviation regarding the acceptability 
of the four different conditions for each question.
The results on the first question indicate two significant effects. Fallacious 
responses were less accepted (M = 4.02) than non-fallacious ones (M = 4.78) [F1 
(1, 40) = 71.37, p < 0.001; F2 (1, 39) = 57.34, p < 0.001]. We also report a sig-
nificant effect for the presence or absence of étant donné que: statements with a 
Table 5  Experiment 1b testing the presence of puisque vs. the absence of puisque 
Mean Standard deviation
Question 1: Proportion
Fallacious argument with puisque
Fallacious argument without puisque
Non-fallacious argument with puisque
Non-fallacious argument without puisque
3.095
3.346
4.072
4.074
0.764
0.739
0.663
0.773
Question 2: Coherence
Fallacious argument with puisque
Fallacious argument without puisque
Non-fallacious argument with puisque
Non-fallacious argument without puisque
3.545
3.822
4.172
4.271
0.708
0.653
0.587
0.640
Question 3: Agreement with Alexandre
Fallacious argument with puisque
Fallacious argument without puisque
Non-fallacious argument with puisque
Non-fallacious argument without puisque
3.162
3.440
4.190
4.404
0.734
0.687
0.650
0.579
Question 4: Agreement with Barbara
Fallacious argument with puisque
Fallacious argument without puisque
Non-fallacious argument with puisque
Non-fallacious argument without puisque
4.354
4.451
4.586
4.645
0.580
0.694
0.552
0.511
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connective introducing the argument were less accepted (M = 4.33) than state-
ments with an implicit causal relation (M = 4.47) [F1 (1, 40) = 6.05, p < 0.05; F2 
(1,39) = 7.740, p < 0.01].
On the question targeting the logical link between Barbara’s and Alexandre’s 
statements, the analysis returned a significant effect on the nature of the argu-
ment: non-fallacious arguments were more accepted (M = 4.81) than fallacious 
ones (M = 4.38) [F1 (1, 40) = 38.46, p < 0.001; F2 (1, 39) = 24.54, p < 0.001]. 
For the presence or absence of the connective étant donné, the analysis returned 
results approaching significance in both analyses [F1 (1, 40) = 3.98, p = 0.05; F2 
(1,39) = 3.25, p = 0.08].
The third question returned a similar pattern. For the type of argument, 
the analysis returned a significant effect, non-fallacious arguments were more 
accepted (M = 4.78) than fallacious ones (M = 3.97) [F1 (1, 40) = 105.56, 
p < 0.001; F2 (1,39) = 55.13, p < 0.001]. No effect was found between state-
ments with or without connective [F1 (1, 40) = 1.03, p = 0.31; F2 (1, 39) = 1.54, 
p = 0.22].
The results on the fourth question, the agreement with Barbara, did not return 
a significant effect for the type of argument even though the values approach sig-
nificance [F1 (1, 40) = 3.63, p = 0.06; F2 (1, 39) = 3.87, p = 0.05] or the presence 
or absence of the connective étant donné que [F1 (1, 40) = 0.65, p = 0.42; F2 (1, 
39) = 0.54, p = 0.47].
Table 6  Experiment 1b testing the presence of étant donné que vs. the absence of étant donné que 
Mean Standard deviation
Question 1: Proportion
Fallacious argument with étant donné que
Fallacious argument without étant donné que
Non-fallacious argument with étant donné que
Non-fallacious argument without étant donné que
3.971
4.058
4.680
4.880
0.898
0.799
0.602
0.599
Question 2: Coherence
Fallacious argument with étant donné que
Fallacious argument without étant donné que
Non-fallacious argument with étant donné que
Non-fallacious argument without étant donné que
4.349
4.407
4.743
4.883
0.735
0.733
0.615
0.607
Question 3: Agreement with Alexandre
Fallacious argument with étant donné que
Fallacious argument without étant donné que
Non-fallacious argument with étant donné que
Non-fallacious argument without étant donné que
3.989
3.942
4.681
4.877
0.739
0.772
0.592
0.578
Question 4: Agreement with Barbara
Fallacious argument with étant donné que
Fallacious argument without étant donné que
Non-fallacious argument with étant donné que
Non-fallacious argument without étant donné que
4.799
4.803
4.988
4.897
0.623
0.517
0.491
0.607
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4.7  Results for the connective vu que
The means and standard deviation for the acceptability of each condition are 
reported in Table 7.
The question targeting proportionality returned a significant effect for the 
nature of the argument. Non-fallacious responses scored a higher acceptability 
(M = 4.29) than fallacious ones (M = 3.53) [F1 (1, 39) = 59.33, p < 0.001; F2 
(1,39) = 70.24, p < 0.001]. The results also returned a significant effect for the 
presence or absence of vu que. Statements with the causal connective introduc-
ing the argument were less accepted (M = 3.82) than statements with an implicit 
causal relation (M = 3.40) [F1 (1, 39) = 6.30, p = 0.02; F2 (1,39) = 5.94, p = 0.02].
We found the same pattern on the question about the logical link between 
the statements. Again, the results indicated two main effects: fallacious argu-
ments were less accepted (M = 3.92) than non-fallacious ones (M = 4.42) [F1 (1, 
39) = 40.09, p < 0.001; F2 (1,39) = 32.67, p < 0.001] and statements without the 
connective vu que were more accepted (M = 4.24) compared to the explicit ver-
sion with the connective (M = 4.10) [F1 (1, 39) = 4.47, p = 0.04; F2 (1,39) = 4.19, 
p = 0.04].
For the third question, we found a significant effect for the nature of the argu-
ment: non-fallacious arguments were better accepted (M = 4.38) than fallacious ones 
(M = 3.65) [F1 (1, 39) = 43.85, p < 0.001; F2 (1,39) = 42.98, p < 0.001]. No effect 
was found for the presence or absence of the connective [F1 (1, 39) = 0.28, p = 0.60; 
F2 (1,39) = 0.15, p = 0.70].
Table 7  Experiment 1c testing the presence of vu que vs. the absence of vu que 
Mean Standard deviation
Question 1: Proportion
Fallacious argument with vu que
Fallacious argument without vu que
Non-fallacious argument with vu que
Non-fallacious argument without vu que
3.412
3.656
4.235
4.341
0.721
0.775
0.706
0.879
Question 2: Coherence
Fallacious argument with vu que
Fallacious argument without vu que
Non-fallacious argument with vu que
Non-fallacious argument without vu que
3.845
3.989
4.349
4.492
0.722
0.861
0.736
0.813
Question 3: Agreement with Alexandre
Fallacious argument with vu que
Fallacious argument without vu que
Non-fallacious argument with vu que
Non-fallacious argument without vu que
3.611
3.684
4.378
4.376
0.632
0.601
0.659
0.689
Question 4: Agreement with Barbara
Fallacious argument with vu que
Fallacious argument without vu que
Non-fallacious argument with vu que
Non-fallacious argument without vu que
4.519
4.496
4.601
4.587
0.589
0.695
0.615
0.745
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The question targeting the agreement with Barbara did not return any effect for 
the nature of argument [F1 (1, 39) = 1.19, p = 0.28; F2 (1,39) = 2.33, p = 0.13]. No 
significant results were found on the presence or absence of the connective vu que 
[F1 (1, 39) = 0.06, p = 0.81; F2 (1,39) = 0.49, p = 0.49].
4.8  Results for the Connective comme
In Table 8 we report the means and standard deviation for the acceptability of the 
four experimental conditions per question.
For the first question targeting the proportionality of Alexandre’s answer, the anal-
ysis returned a significant effect of the type of argument. Participants accepted the 
non-fallacious statements more (M = 4.47) compared to fallacious ones (M = 3.52) 
[F1 (1, 39) = 102.44, p < 0.001; F2 (1,39) = 56.74, p < 0.001]. There was no effect 
of the presence or absence of comme [F1 (1, 39) = 0.55, p = 0.46; F2 (1,39) = 0.32, 
p = 0.57].
Answers to the question targeting the logical link between the two statements 
yielded the same pattern of results. The analysis returned a significant effect of the 
type of argument: fallacious arguments were less accepted (M = 4.10) compared to 
non-fallacious ones (M = 4.59) [F1 (1, 39) = 43.33, p < 0.001; F2 (1, 39) = 30.45, 
p < 0.001]. Again, the presence or absence of comme did not trigger different accept-
ability scores [F1 (1, 39) = 1.65, p = 0.21; F2 (1, 39) = 1.06, p = 0.31].
Table 8  Experiment 1d testing the presence of comme vs the absence of comme 
Mean Standard deviation
Question 1: Proportion
Fallacious argument with comme
Fallacious argument without comme
Non-fallacious argument with comme
Non-fallacious argument without comme
3.462
3.587
4.494
4.449
0.635
0.788
0.708
0.753
Question 2: Coherence
Fallacious argument with comme
Fallacious argument without comme
Non-fallacious argument with comme
Non-fallacious argument without comme
4.067
4.135
4.556
4.623
0.628
0.718
0.609
0.627
Question 3: Agreement with Alexandre
Fallacious argument with comme
Fallacious argument without comme
Non-fallacious argument with comme
Non-fallacious argument without comme
3.512
3.527
4.517
4.472
0.694
0.586
0.557
0.716
Question 4: Agreement with Barbara
Fallacious argument with comme
Fallacious argument without comme
Non-fallacious argument with comme
Non-fallacious argument without comme
4.761
4.711
4.855
4.918
0.525
0.568
0.512
0.602
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Similar results were found for the question targeting the agreement with Alexan-
dre. Fallacious arguments were significantly less accepted (M = 3.52) compared to 
non-fallacious ones (M = 4.49) [F1 (1, 39) = 104.73, p < 0.001; F2 (1, 39) = 62.31, 
p < 0.001]. The presence or absence of comme did not produce a significant effect 
[F1 (1, 39) = 0.03, p = 0.85; F2 (1, 39) = 0.02, p = 0.88].
Finally, the same pattern was again found for the question targeting the agreement 
with Barbara. Fallacious arguments were less accepted (M = 4.74) compared to non-
fallacious ones (M = 4.89) [F1 (1, 39) = 6.29, p = 0.02; F2 (1,39) = 7.15, p = 0.01]. 
with the connective comme did not produce a significant effect [F1 (1, 39) = 0.01, 
p = 0.91; F2 (1,39) = 0.30, p = 0.58].
5  General Discussion
We pursued three goals with this paper: first, we wanted to investigate whether the 
acceptability of straw man fallacies could be influenced by the presence or absence 
of different causal connectives with attributive meaning. Second, we wanted to dem-
onstrate that the individual nuances of each connective used in our experiments lead 
to different effects. Third, we wanted to show that subjectivity is not the only trigger 
influencing the acceptability of arguments.
Before we discuss the results regarding the main objectives of the paper, some 
general conclusions about the participants’ capability to spot fallacies must be 
addressed. The results we obtained clearly show that participants intuitively spot 
the fallacies. Across all four experiments, they indicated strong preferences towards 
non-fallacious arguments compared to fallacious ones. As expected, the effect was 
always present for the first three questions targeting the exaggerative nature of the 
straw man, the logical link between both statements and the agreement with Alexan-
der. For the agreement with Barbara, we observe that sometimes we find significant 
effects and other times we do not. This is due to the fact that responses given on this 
question were not expected to be influenced by the manipulated variables as the first 
three questions, but by their personal opinions and preferences. We find, across all 
our studies, previous (Schumann et  al.  2019) and present, that people are usually 
better at detecting fallacies than at not detecting them. This result also reflects the 
findings from van Eemeren et  al. (2009) which showed that people generally pre-
fer sound arguments over arguments that derail into unreasonableness and violate 
the norms for critical discussion. The results form van Eemeren et  al. (2009) and 
the results obtained from the current study, taken together, also point towards the 
conclusion that investigating a fallacy’s perceived  reasonableness and assessing a 
fallacy’s persuasiveness are intertwined to a certain extent. The chances for an argu-
ment to be persuasive increase when the argument is perceived as reasonable, or as 
we demonstrated, acceptable. To provide a more detailed account on the relationship 
between the reasonableness and the persuasiveness of fallacies, more experimental 
work needs to be conducted, specifically focusing on a separate assessment of both 
factors on the same data. Furthermore, our results are also consistent with the recent 
work of Mercier (2020) which demonstrates that people are generally more openly 
vigilant than one might assume. Now, our research also allows us to make justified 
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claims about what happens in cases in which participants do not detect the fallacy, 
and notably regarding the role of different connectives.
Turning to the main argument of this paper, we observe various effects for the use 
of causal connectives with an attributive meaning. All the results are summarized in 
Table 9. We used the tag ‘yes’ to indicate that there was a significant effect show-
ing a lower acceptability for arguments (normal and fallacious) introduced with a 
connective, ‘no’ to indicate that there was no effect, and ‘fuzzy’ to indicate that the 
effect was only approaching significance in one of the analysis or both, which could 
be due to lack of statistical power.
Looking at the connective puisque, the results strongly indicate that it acts as the 
strongest forewarning device, leading participants to be more cautious when reading 
the segment following the connective. The strongly subjective nature of the con-
nective results in lower acceptability rates compared to the implicit version without 
the presence of any connective. But as we illustrated in Sect. 3, subjectivity is not 
the only feature characterizing the connective. The fact that puisque is frequently 
used to express given information creates a discrepancy between the reader’s expec-
tation to see known information, and the distorted version of the original argument 
found in the case of a straw man. In addition, the connective conveys a dissociative 
and therefore negative attitude towards the expressed content, clearly indicating that 
there is a distance between Alexandre’s reply and Barbara’s original statement. This 
could act as a hint, warning participants about Alexandre’s potentially biased atti-
tude towards Barbara’s statement, and therefore leading them to be more vigilant 
and to endorse a more critical attitude towards the expressed content.
Comparing the results for puisque with the results for the other highly subjective 
connective vu que, we notice that the effect is still significant for the exaggerative 
nature and the logical link, but the agreement with Alexandre is not. This is due to 
the fact that compared to puisque, vu que does not express that same negative atti-
tude, but indicates a much more endorsing attitude. Vu que therefore still acts as a 
forewarner, because it is a subjective connective and is used to convey given infor-
mation, but it is not as strong as puisque because of the missing dissociative nature.
Comparing the results for the first two connectives with the results for étant 
donné que, we notice a much more mixed profile in this case. Not only is étant 
donné que weaker in terms of subjectivity and givenness, but it also conveys a much 
more neutral attitude towards the expressed content. This explains why we still find 
a forewarning effect to some degree when it comes to the exaggerative nature, but no 
effect at all for the logical link or the agreement with Alexandre.
Table 9  Summary of the effects 
found for the role of connectives
Exaggeration Logical link Agree-
ment 
with A
Agree-
ment 
with B
puisque Fuzzy Yes Yes No
étant donné que Yes Fuzzy No No
vu que Yes Yes No No
comme No No No No
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Finally, the results for comme confirm that this connective does not act as a fore-
warner at all because it is a much more neutral connective frequently used to con-
vey objective and new content, which was not the case for the other connectives, 
thus allowing for an increased chance of non-attributive interpretations—or for 
weaker attributive readings. It is therefore possible to create a profile of the connec-
tives according to their strength as a forewarner as follows: puisque > vu que > étant 
donné que > comme. This scale is not only in line with the subjectivity and given-
ness of the different connectives, but it also takes into consideration the polarity of 
attitude.
In sum, the experiments described in this paper show that connectives do play 
a role for the communication of fallacious arguments. The results found in our 
research lend further support to our previous work (Schumann et al. 2019) and the 
conclusions put forward by Kamalski et al. (2008), namely the idea that argumenta-
tive texts with subjective connectives are less persuasive than their objective coun-
terparts. According to our results, the connectives that are more marked not only 
on the subjectivity feature, but also on givenness and speaker attitude, like puisque, 
vu que and étant donné que, lead to lower acceptability scores for arguments, be 
they fallacious or non-fallacious. This strongly underlines the findings of Kamalski 
et  al. (2008), pointing towards the conclusion that all these connectives really do 
announce some persuasive intention behind the statement. Comme stands out, as it is 
the only connective that is not marked on any of the features we described and sub-
sequently does not create a forewarning effect, which provides further confirmation 
for the findings of Kamalski et al. (2008).
Importantly, we demonstrated that due to their various features, different connec-
tives lead to different results. Even though subjectivity is a strong factor, it is not the 
only feature triggering lower acceptability scores for arguments. The polarity of the 
speaker’s attitude towards the expressed content does indeed play a significant role 
for the communication of straw man fallacies.
Overall, this research has highlighted that findings from other fields of inves-
tigation like discourse processing and corpus studies give us a more fine-grained 
description of the characteristics of causal connectives which can be beneficial to 
the study of argumentation because it gives us a deeper understanding of the fac-
tors that influence the acceptability of fallacious and non-fallacious arguments. Such 
in-depth studies of the characteristics of connectives, focusing on their various fea-
tures of meaning and usage, help assessing their function in argumentative settings, 
and help to uncover the role of linguistic elements as indicators of argumentative 
moves generally. The present paper shows that we are able to capture general intui-
tions from argumentative practice, by demonstrating that people confide in linguis-
tic formulations to orient themselves across an argumentative context, i.e. to find a 
potential difference of opinion, to discern the argument, or to interpret the coherence 
relation between the discourse segments. In turn, these formulations also coerce the 
extent of the resources people use to evaluate an argumentation by guiding their 
interpretation of the information, helping us to enlighten some rhetorical properties 
of a given message: will it be accepted without a notable counter-effort (like with 
comme) or will it make strides (like with puisque)?
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